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EFFECTS OF INFORMATION REPORT FREQUENCY
IN MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
The choice of an information system affects not only the man-
agement control system that incorporates the information, but
also the managers who utilize the control system and the under-
lying process that is the target of control. This study, using
standard labor efficiency variances, explores effects of in for
mation report frequency on managers' judgments and decisions
concerning cost variance investigation. General hypotheses
are developed based on concepts concerning human understanding
of causation and confidence in judgment. Specific hypotheses
are derived within a hypothetical production environment and
are tested within a laboratory experiment. The results support
the hypotheses, and the study concludes that changes in report
frequency can affect the manager's causal understanding of
production variation, as well as the efficiency (compared to a
normative model) of the costs incurred above standard.
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EFFECTS OF INFORMATION REPORT FREQUENCY
IN MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
One of the major impacts of accountants on businesses is the
design and operation of information systems used for management
control. The choice of specific parameters for an information
system affects not only the management control system that in-
corporates the information, but also the managers who utilize
the control system and the underlying process that is the target
of control. Many of these system parameters are chosen by, or
on the advice of, accountants. Therefore, accounting research,
to acknowledge the potential effects of information system
choice, should study the effects of alternative information
system parameters (such as information report format and struc-
ture, information report frequency, and level of information
aggregation) on individuals who utilize the control system.
A theoretical framework with which one could approach such
objectives is that concerning human understanding of causation
(cf., Einhorn and Hogarth [1983; 1985]). Many managers' judg-
ments, evaluations, and actions involve either predicting
future events or determining the causes of past events. When
managers rely, at least in part, on information reported from
management control systems, the nature and structure of the
information can affect their diagnosis of cause(s) of events
and their prediction of the occurence(s) of events. Further,
alternative diagnoses and predictions generally will produce
differ' ent control decisions/actions and as a result, different
(possibly sub -optimal) performances. Thus, accounting research
-2-
that. addresses the processes of diagnostic inference and pre-
diction required for manager decision making should facilitate
an understanding" of information system choice and, ultimately,
improved manager performance.
The objective of this paper is to extend knowledge concern-
ing the effects of information report frequency on managers'
judgments and decisions. This study employes standard labor
efficiency variances as accounting reports of operating
performance requiring diagnosis prior to formulation of per-
1
formance evaluations and choice of control actions. The next
section discusses psychological processes underlying managers'
judgments and decisions, including the derivation of general
hypotheses within the context of making cost variance investi-
gation decisions. The experimental environment, including a
description of the management control system and a simulation
of an underlying controlled process, is presented in the third
section. Employing the described control system and simulated
controlled process in a laboratory experiment, the fourth
section contains a description of the experiment, including
results. The last section contains concluding remarks.
Th§_Manager^s_Judgments_and Decisions
Diagnostic inference is a central component for under-
standing one's experiences. Individuals identify relationships
within experienced events and objects as a result of analyzing
specific instances of those events and objects. The importance
of diagnostic: inference* can be seen in terms o f its effect on
prediction and on choice of action. Prediction depends upon
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the predictor's understanding of the underlying process that
generates outcomes [Einhorn and Hogarth, 1982]. Actions taken
will depend, at least in part, on beliefs concerning the cir-
cumstances that caused (or will cause) the event, or situation
[Hogarth, 1981]. For example, a manager's understanding of a
production variance will depend upon his(her) inferred theory
of the processes that generate variances within the production
system involved. Further, performance evaluations and control
actions will differ when a production variance is believed to
have been caused by a given circumstance (e.g. , inadequate
production labor efficiency), than when the cause is believed
to be some other circumstance (e.g., inadequate direct
materials quality).
Learning Causal Relationships
The conditions for learning relationships between events
have been the subject of inquiry for a number of psychological
studies. An understanding of the conditions for learning re-
lationships requires an understanding of the task environment
(including the nature of feedback), choice of actions, outcomes
(feedback), and the interpretation, coding in memory, and the
subsequent recall from memory of those outcomes [Hogarth, 1980]
Einhorn and Hogarth [1978], Einhorn [1980], Hogarth [1981] and
Brown [1983] discuss some effects the task environment can have
2
on learning of relationships.
Human memory affects both the perception of the judgment
task and the selection and processing of information [Hogarth,
1980]. Tn the construct ivist view of long-term memory, the
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st ructure of experience is considered to be the creation of the
perceiver [ B lumen t ha 1 , 1977]. Human memory is a process of re-
construct ion based upon concepts, images, and schemata that
have meaning to the perceiver. These concepts, images, and
schemata guide the interpretation, as well as the encoding and
subsequent recall, of information.
A number of studies have indicated that people often dis-
count "base-rate" information in favor of case specific infor-
mation in forming their judgments [Kahnemann and Tversky,
3
1973]. Hogarth [1980] speculates that concrete, case specific
information is more salient than abstract base-rates, and is
more likely to be encoded and remembered than are base-rates.
Thus, over time, frequencies of observed outcomes are more likely
to be encoded and remembered than are inherited base-rates
which summarize and describe unobserved outcomes from the past.
Based upon this stream of psychological research, the
following general hypothesis is proposed within the context of
deciding whether to investigate standard cost variances:
Managers' lived experience (observed causal frequencies)
will have greater salience than inherited, abstract
base-rates and thus, greater association with the managers'
understanding of the underlying target of control.
Confidence in Judgment
Confidence in judgment under uncertainty is an important
component of the judgment process itself. Diagnosis will have
little, or negative , value to managers when the degree of
confidence in such diagnosis is unknown or is substantially
-5-
biased [Brown, 1984]. Confidence has been primarily examined
in terras of the appropriateness of probability assessments
[Oskamp, 1962". This attribute of probability assessment has
more recently been labeled calibration [Lichtenstein, Fischhoff
and Phillips, 1982]. This approach examines the relation be-
tween subjects' probability assessments and the proportions of
true propositions over a large number of instances. An indi-
vidual is considered to be overconfident when, for all proposi
tions assigned a given probability, the proportion that is true
is less than the probability assigned. Conversely, an individ-
ual is considered to be underconfident when the proportion that
is true is greater than the probability assigned. Graphing the
proportion correct over a distribution of probability responses
produces a "calibration curve."
The predominate result in research employing this concept
of confidence is that people tend to be overconfident in their
judgments [ L i cht ens t e in , Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982; Nisbett
and Ross, 1980; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; Fischhoff, SI o vie
4
and Lichtenstein, 1977]. Most miscal ibration studies,
however, involve a series of one-shot probability assessments
rather than revisions of judgments based on accumulating
evidence. Studies using Bayesian inference as a descriptive
model found that subjects' assessed probability did not in-
crease as rapidly as additional evidence, processed using
Bayes' theorem, indicated that it should (this effect is label-
ed "conservatism"; for a review see Slovic and Lichtenstein
[1971]). Since the task structure within the context of making
-6
standard cost variance investigation decisions involves
revisions of judgments rather than one-shot assessments, the
following general hypothesis is proposed:
Managers' assessed confidence in their investigation de-
cisions will not change as much as the evidence indicates
that they should.
Ex.E§rinientai_Environment
Control System Environment
Although management control systems are designed to be used
at a number of management levels, this study focuses upon con-
trol and information system usage at a middle? management level.
Managers at such a level do not have day-to-day interaction
with the operations for which they are responsible, and must
rely largely on control and information systems to make the
various evaluations and decisions required of their positions.
Specific parameters of the underlying controlled process and
the control and accounting information system employed in this
study are based on those used by Brown [1981; 1983] . These
parameters are presented in Table 1.
lD?ert_Table_l_AboutHere
The assembly process is considered to be in one of two
mutually exclusive and exhaustive states: in-control or out-of-
control. Assembly process problems correctable by a line
supervisor are considered to be part of the in-control
distribution unless the line supervisor fails to correct the
problem. Assembly process problems not corrected or not
correctable by a line supervisor are considered to be part of
-7-
the out-of-con t ro 1 distribution. Once out-of-con t rol , the
assembly process is assumed to remain out-of-control until the
middle-level manager orders an investigation of the problem.
Once investigated, an out-of-control assembly process is
assumed to be corrected and returned to the in-control state.
Simulation of the Underlying Controlled Process
Simulation was first employed to randomly sample weekly
production outcomes from the underlying distributions (speci-
fied in Table 1) using the rules specified above. The same
observations then were combined into biweekly production out-
comes using the following rules: 1) when the first week of a
biweekly period was out-of-control, the second week of that
period continued to be out-of-control, and 2) the biweekly
operating results were equal to an additive combination of
the two component weeks.
These production outcomes then were used to form labor
efficiency variance reports for both weekly and biweekly time
periods. Thirty years of production was simulated in which the
critical value of a labor efficiency variance that triggered
investigation was determined using the following heuristic:
investigate the reported variance when,
)pix^out-of-cont rol | "^ __EliO:_con t ro 1 )_ __ cost 1
p ( x ! in-cont rol ) ' p ( out-of-con t ro 1 ) ratio ,
where x is an observed labor efficiency variance and the cost
ratio is the marginal cost of investigating an in control labor
«
variance divided by the marginal cost of not investigating an
out-of-control labor variance (cf., Brown [1983]).
8-
Insert_Table_2_About_Here
The results of the thirty years' production simulation
(1560 weekly periods or 780 biweekly periods) are presented in
Table 2. Reducing the report frequency had a number of effects
on the management control system and the underlying controlled
process. Reducing the report frequency extends the minimum
length of time that the process can be out-of-cont rol prior to
being investigated and corrected, which increases the expected
costs associated with not investigating an out-of-cont ro
1
variance. Thus, the cost ratio declined from 0.50 to 0.18.
Although reducing the report frequency reduced the abso-
lute number of out -of-con t ro 1 variances (from 194 to 176), the
frequency of out-of-con t r o 1 variances relative to the number
of report periods almost doubled from 12.4% to 22.6%. The
statistical variance of the in-control labor hours per week
decreased by 55.7% (from 1108.94 to 490.89), while the statis-
tical variance of the out-of-cont ro 1 labor hours per week In-
creased by 21.3% (from 2382.81 to 2890.19). The net effect, of
these changes in statistical variance was to increase the ratio
of the in-control statistical variance to the out -o f-con t ro
1
statistical variance from 2.15 to 5.89.
These changes jointly shifted the optimal critical decision
value closer to the mean of the in-control distribution (closer
to the labor efficiency standard). The shift in the normative
critical decision value increased the percent of in—control
labor variances investigated (from 5.3% to 9.4% and decreased
the percent of o u t - o f - c o n t r o 1 labor variances not immediately
investigated (from 18.6% to 10.2%). Finally, the effect on
-9-
operating costs of the report frequency change and the associ-
ated changes in the underlying controlled process was to in-
crease average annual costs above standard by 44.3% (from
$10,081.92 to $14,551.88).
Experimental Environment
Subjects in the lab experiment were asked to assume the
role of an assembly department manager within the communica-
tions division of a large electronics manufacturing company.
Within this role subjects were presented with a production
game that consisted of a sequential series of standard cos I
variance reports for which they were asked to decide whether an
investigation of their department's assembly labor process
should be made. The cost variance reported was a labor effic-
iency variance stated in terms of assembly hours and standard
dollars per report period. The control states, the distribu-
tional parameters for each control state, and the relationships
among the costs associated with the action-outcome possibilit-
ies (cost ratios) were the same as described in the simulation
above. The report period, an experimental variable, was either
weekly or biweekly.
Within this task the information available to the decision
maker came from a number of sources. The first source was in-
formation from past, experiences and was presented to the sub
jects in the form of a background information booklet read
prior to their experimental session. This booklet indicated
(1) the prior probabilities of the two control states, (2) the
prior probabilities of the major causes of the out-of-cont rol
-10-
state, (3) that the? variances followed a normal distribution,
(4) the observed range (highest and lowest values) of the de-
partment's past labor efficiency variances both when known to
be out-of-control and when believed to be in-control, and ( 5
)
the expected costs associated with the various action-outcome
poss ib i 1 i t ies .
The second source of information came from the variance
report and from investigation feedback resulting from variance
investigation. The variance report (see Appendix A) included
(in both labor hour and standard dollar measurements) the
standard labor allowed for actual production, the actual labor
incurred, the labor efficiency variance (labeled as either fa-
vorable or unfavorable), the labor efficiency variance as a
percent of standard, and the department's labor efficiency bud-
get remaining after the variance. The labor efficiency budget,
set annually, included expected labor costs above standard as
well as budgeted investigation and correction costs.
The outcomes of decisions t o_ i n yes t igat e were made avail-
able immediately following such decisions. The outcomes were
in the form of two reports: one from the production engineer-
ing department indicating the results of investigation and the
other from the plant controller indicating the investigation
costs being charged to the department's labor efficiency budget
Another source of information was the subject's performance
report from the product group manager (the subject's immediate
superior). The frequency of this performance report , an
experimental variable, was either quarterly or semiannually.
This report indicated the subject's periodic I at) or efficiency
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cont rol performance as a percentile of all department, managers'
performances and the subject's periodic control performance
bonus. Subjects were told that minimizing their department's
labor costs above standard (including investigation and correc-
tion costs) would maximize their performance bonuses. A sub-
ject's payment for participating in the experiment was equal to
a percentage of the labor efficiency control performance bonuses
earned while playing the production game. The actual payments
ranged from a maximum of $11.00 to a minimum of $1.00.
Th®_Experiment
Design
The design of the production game used in this experiment
was a 2 X 2 X T mixed design. The be tween-sub j ect s variables,
each at two levels, were standard cost variance report fre-
quency (weekly or biweekly) and manager performance report
frequency (quarterly or semiannually). The wi thin-sub jects
variable was the series of variance reports over a two year
period (T = 104 for weekly variance reports and T = 52 for
biweekly variance reports).
Sub j ec t
s
The subjects were undergraduate and master's level graduate
students enrolled in management accounting and management in-
formation systems courses in the business school of a large
state university. Offered payments contingent upon their per-
formances in the experiment, a total of 72 volunteer subjects
participated. Subjects were randomly assigned to a level of
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each bet ween-sub jec t s variable with the restriction that the
four cells remained equal. Upon assignment to a treatment con-
dition each subject received the background information booklet
Procedures
The production game was conducted in a personal computer (PC)
laboratory containing 20 machines. Subject to a one-hour lab
time limit, each subject completed the experiment at his (her)
own pace, independent of the other subjects in the lab. The
The game program began with a brief introduction to the PC key-
board which was followed by a review of the information contain-
ed in the background booklet, specific instructions, and a
practice labor efficiency variance report with feedback.
The experiment began with a report of the manager's annual
labor efficiency budget for labor costs above standard (including
investigation and correction costs), and was followed by the
first labor efficency variance report. For each variance
report the subject was asked if he(she) wanted that variance
investigated and how confident they were that their decision
was "the best" given the circumstances. Reports from the
production engineering department (indicating the results of
investigation) and from the controller (indicating the costs
of investigation and correction [if any]) immediately followed
variances that the subject decided to have investigated. This
series of reports continued for a two year period (104 weekly
series or 5 2 biweekly series). Each subject received the
report evaluating their labor efficiency control performance
report at the end of either each quarter or each semiannual
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period, depending upon their treatment condition.
At the end of each quarter the subjects' causal probabil-
ities were elicited by having them indicate the probability
that they believed the next out-of-cont rol labor efficiency
variance would be caused by each of the three most likely
causes of such variances (production equipment maintenance,
assembly-line employee turnover, and raw material quality).
At the completion of the production game the subject's total
labor efficiency control performance bonus was displayed, the
subject was asked to complete a brief biographic questionnaire
and was instructed on receiving his(her) payment.
Dependent Variables
C§usal_probab i 1 i t ies^ At the end of each quarter the sub-
jects were asked to state their beliefs concerning the probabil-
ities associated with the three most likely causes of their de-
partment's out-of-cont rol labor efficiency variances. Causal
probability was elicited using a 100 percentage point scale rang
ing from 0% (minimum probability) to 100% (maximum probability).
The precision of these beliefs was derived using the causal
probabilities that a normative probability model would assign,
given each subject's observations over the same time period.
The normative probability model employed in this analysis began
with the inherited base-rates and, using relative frequencies,
adjusted the causal probabilities as observations occurred.
The measure of subject i's causal probability precision for
cause c at the end of quarter q is defined as:
Precision
lcq
(SCP - NCP )/NCP
icq icq icq
(2)
-14-
where, SCP = Subject i's causal probability for cause c at
i cq
the end of quarter q, and
NCP = Normative probability model's causal probabil-
i cq
ity given subject i's observations, for cause c
at the end of quarter q.
Conf idenceinlnvest igat ion_Decisions 1 Following each vari-
ance investigation decision the subject indicated confidence in
that decision. Confidence, defined to be the belief that one's
decision is the best in the circumstances, was elicited using a
ten-point scale ranging from (minimum confidence) to 10
(maximum confidence). The magnitude of over or under
confidence is measured by:
Over/Under
Confidence
ij
CONF - (CD /TD )
i J i J i J
(3)
where, CONF = Subject i's mean confidence assessment within
i J
experimental condition j,
CD = Subject i's number of "correct" decisions with-
i j
in experimental condition j, and
TD = Subject i's total number of decisions within
i j
experimental condition j.
To control for the effects of asymmetric error costs, a "correct"
decision was defined to be the decision made by an optimal model
in the same informational circumstances as the subject (see
equat i on 1 ) .
Calibration curves were constructed by separat Lag each
subject's confidence responses into five categories. The
confidence categories were five subdivisions of the to 10
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confidence response scale (0 to 5.0, 5.0 to 6.25, 6.25 to 7.5,
5
7.5 to 8.75, and 8.75 to 10.0). The calibration curves graph
the subjects' percentage "correct" decisions by their mean
confidence response for each of the five confidence categories.
Cos tsaboyes tandard^ Costs above standard, as indicated
by the simulation above, were expected to differ between the
levels of the variance report frequency variable. To produce a
measure comparable over all treatment conditions, each sub-
ject's annual costs above standard were compared with those of
a normative model, producing a measure of the efficiency of
costs above standard. The normative model employed in this
analysis was a model that received the same observations as the
subject and made its investigation decisions using equation 1.
The measure of subject i's cost efficiency for year j was
defined as
:
Cost Efficiency (SC
ij ij
NC ) / NC
j J
(4)
where, SC = Subject i's costs above standard for year j, and
i j
NC = Normative model's costs above standard for year j
j
Specific Hypotheses
Causal probab ili ties ^ The causal probabilities generated
by the normative probability model began with the inherited
base-rates of .50, .30, and .20 for the three possible causes
of out.-of-control labor efficiency variances. The prior
probability of the possible cause with the highest base -rate,
product ion equipment, maintenance, increased to .60 by the end
of the eighth quarter, and the prior probability of the
-16
possible cause with the lowest base-rate, raw material quality,
decreased to .15 by the end of the eighth quarter. The prior
probability of the possible cause with the middle base-rate,
assembly-line employee turnover, decreased to .25 by the end of
the eighth quarter. Generating the causal probab i 1 i 1 i t ies
using a model that ignors the inherited base-rates, in favor of
observed frequencies, results in prior probabilities at the end
of the eighth quarter of .70, .20, and .10, respectively. Thus,
in this context, if subjects ignor inherited base-rates in
favor of observed frequencies the following hypothesis would be
true:
HI. The precision of the subjects causal probabilities will
decrease over the eight quarters of the production game.
lDY§s t igat iondecis ionconf idence^ Investigation decision
confidence is a function of 1) learning a sufficient critical
cost variance decision value, above which investigation is
warranted, and 2) the extent of the control states' distribu-
tioal overlap for an observed cost variance. Holding the sec-
ond factor constant, learning a critical decision value occurs
through experience with the underlying target of control and
control system. Prior critical decision values are adjusted
as evidence accumulates concerning their sufficiency. Thus,
this aspect of the task structure involves revisions of
judgments rather than one-shot assessments, and the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H2. The subjects will be underconfident in their investi-
gation decisions.
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Cos t_e f f ic i ency^ In the simulation, when the variance re-
port frequency changed from weekly to biweekly, both the opti-
mal critical investigation decision value and the statistical
variances of the control states also changed. The result was
that the combined area of the states' overlap decreased by 8.3%
given biweekly variance reports. Therefore, discrimination of
cost variances should be more difficult with weekly variance
reports than with biweekly reports. Assuming a subject's de-
cision cost efficiency is monot on i cal ly related to discrimina-
tion efficiency, the following hypothesis should be true:
H3 . Subjects receiving biweekly cost variance reports will
exhibit greater cost efficiency than subjects receiving
weekly cost variance reports.
Results
Causal probab ili ties
._
Precision of causal probab i 1 i t ies
was examined using ANOVA with a2X2X3X8 mixed design in
which the be tween-sub j ec t s variables, each at two levels, were
the variance report frequency and the performance report fre-
quency. One w i t h i n-sub j ec t s variable, at three levels, was the
possible causes of out -of- control labor efficiency variances.
The second w i th i n-sub jec ts variable, at eight levels, was the
eight quarters of the production game. The dependent variable
was that described by equation 2.
Tnsert_ Tab le_3_ About Here
This analysis, presented in Table 3, indicates a number of
significant effects. Hypothesis I predicted a significant main
effect for quarters, which was obtained in the predicted direc-
18
tion (see Table 3). There were, however, a number of signifi-
cant, interactions. One of these significant interactions was
the variance report frequency by performance report frequency
by quarter interaction, presented in Figure 1 . This interac-
tion reveals that although precision of causal probability de-
clines over sequential quarters of experience, it declines less
rapidly when either 1) the variance report frequency is biweek-
ly and the performance report frequency is quarterly, or 2) the
variance report frequency is weekly and the performance report
6
frequency is semiannually.
lD§ert Figure 1 About Here
Hypothesis 1 is further supported by the significant inter-
action of cause by quarter, presented in Figure 2 . This inter-
action reveals that the subjects' o veres t imat i on of the produc-
tion equipment maintenance causal probability increased by the
end of the eighth quarter, and their underestimation of both
the assemb 1 y- 1 i ne employee turnover and the raw material quality
causal probabilities also increased by the end of the eighth
quarter. Within this study's context, these are the same
directions that observed frequencies, ignoring base-rates,
would affect the causal probabilities.
Inser t_
F
igure_ 2_ About Here
I Py ?§ t igat j. ondec i s ioncqn f i dence^ Over/under confidence
in investigation decisions was examined using ANOVA with a 2 X
2 X 2 mixed design in which the between -subjects variables,
each at two levels, were the variance report frequency and t he-
performance report frequency. The within—subjects variable, at
two levels, was the possible investigation decisions (investigate
19-
and do not investigate). The dependent variable was that de-
scribed by equation 3.
As predicted by Hypothesis 2 , the subjects, overall, ex-
hibited underconfidence (the overall mean was -.1106 which is
significantly less than zero [Z=11.64] at p<.001). The ANOVA,
presented in Table 4, indicates two additional significant
effects. First, subjects exhibited significantly less under-
confidence in decisions to investigate (-.0829) than in deci-
sions not to investigate (-.1384). Second, when subjects de
cided not to investigate, the variance report frequency had no
significant effect on decision confidence. However, when sub-
jects decided to investigate, the biweekly report frequency
resulted in significantly less underconfidence than the weekly
report frequency.
Insert_Table_4_About_Here
An expansion of this analysis to incorporate the subjects'
calibration curves (by addition of a five level, within -subjects
variable to the previous ANOVA) resulted in two significant
effects. First, the subjects' overall calibration curves, pre
sented in Figure 3, indicate the subjects were underconfident
over the entire confidence response scale. Second, the sub-
jects' calibration curves indicate that the subjects, over the
entire confidence response scale, were less underconfident in
decisions not to investigate than in decisions to investigate
(see Figure 4 .
I nser t _ F
i
gur es_ 3 and 4 .About Here
(
Qos t s aboves t andard^ Efficiency of costs above standard
was examined using ANOVA with a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design in
20
which the between-sub jects variables, each at two levels, were*
the variance report frequency and the performance report fre-
quency. The within-sub jects variable, at two levels, was the
production game years (year 1 and year 2). The dependent vari-
able was that described by equation 4.
Insert_Table_5_About_Here
This analysis, presented in Table 5, indicates a number of
significant effects. Hypothesis 3 predicted a significant
variance report frequency main effect, which was obtained in
the expected direction (see Table 5).
The interaction of variance report frequency by production
game years was also significant. Presented in Figure 5, this
interaction reveals that although subjects' exhibited greater
cost efficiency when given biweekly variance reports, the
difference was only marginally significant in the first year of
the production game (Z = 1.417, p< 0.077), but was highly sig-
nificant in the second year ( Z = 5.544, p< 0.001). The main
effect for the production game year supports the notion of a
learning effect over the two years (overall cost efficiency
was 0.160 in year 1, but was 0.074 in year 2).
Insert_Figure_5_About_Here
Concludinjg_Remarks
Changes in report frequency not only affects the underlying
targets of control, as demonstrated by the simulation, but also
individuals who utilize the control systems. First, although
absolute costs above standard were significantly greater with
biweekly variance reports than with weekly, the efficiency of
-21-
those costs (compared to a normative model) was greater with
biweekly variance reports than with weekly. Second, the
manager's understanding of the control tar - get's causal struc-
ture was "better" (closer to a normative model) when the two
reports (variance and performance) had mixed frequencies (i.e.,
less frequent variance reports and more frequent performance
reports, or v ice-a- versa ) . The manager's causal understanding,
therefore, was "worse" when both report, frequencies were the
same, combined reporting was either too frequent or too
infrequent. In terms of choosing report frequency within an
information system, tentative conclusions would be to balance
the frequencies of operational and performance reports. The
form of this balance would be in offsetting higher operational
report frequencies with lower performance report frequencies,
or v i ce-a- versa .
With respect to the psychological concepts, by the end of
the eighth quarter of the production game the precision of the
subjects' causal probabilities indicated that, they were more
affected (than was a normative model) by the observed frequencies
than by the inherited base-rates. This result is consistent with
the psychological notion that observed frequencies have greater
salience than inherited base-rates, are attended to and encoded
in memory, and thus have greater association with judgments of
causal probabilities.
Overall, subjects were underconf i den t in their invest iga
tion decisions, consistent with the effects conservatism would
have on revisions of judgments rather than one-shot assessments.
-22-
However, subjects were more under confident (more miscalibra-
ted) in decisions not to investigate cost variances, than in
decisions to investigate. This could be explained if conser-
vatism has a greater effect on decisions that do not involve
relatively immediate actions and largely have unobservable
outcomes (i.e., no immediate feedback).
Future research should extend this study as well as address
the study's limitations. Of particular importance would be the
use of active managers as subjects within experimental environ-
ments based upon their actual work environments. Additional
avenues of future research would be the use of more discretion-
ary performance situations (e.g., research and development de-
partments), and the manipulation of information system vari-
ables such as the validity of evidence sources, conflicting
evidence, as well as the information report format and level of
aggregat ion
.
Within human beings there exists an almost inexhaustible
potential for performance, and a fundamental ingredient to
realizing this performance is the environment within which
the performance is to occur. A long-term research objective,
therefore, should be to develop work environments that will
facilitate individual performance.
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FOOTNOTES
1
These reports were chosen for purposes of maximizing the
structure of accounting information available within the re-
search context.
2
In some situations, outcomes (feedback) may not be known
for alternatives not chosen. Further, feedback received for
chosen alternatives may be biased by events that intervene
between judgment and outcomes. Other task environment effects
may include contextual variability [ Lich t ens t ei n and Slovic,
1971], structure of information [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979],
and nature of information presentation (e.g., primacy and
recency [Libby, forthcoming]).
3
An exception to this has been when the base-rate infor-
mation is seen to be causally linked to the target event
[Bar— Hillel , 1980] .
4
Most overconfidence results have been obtained using gen-
eral knowledge judgments. Some studies, however, have extended
these results using other types of judgments. Overconfidence
has been found in forecasts and planning judgments [Fischhoff
and MaeGreger, 1982; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981], in
self-appraisals of job performance [Thornton, 1980], and in
strategic business problem solving [Stumpf and Zand, 1981].
Other research studies have found conflicting evidence.
Lichtenstein and F i s c h h o f f [1977] f o u n d overconfidence was
reduced when subjects were more knowledgeable. Jennings,
Amabile and Ross [1982] found subjects' theory-based estimates
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of correlation to be less underconfident (better calibrated) in
comparison to subjects' data-based estimates. Solomon [1982]
found auditors' prior probability distributions exhibited
markedly less overconfidence in outer fractile ranges.
5
Although arbitrary, the specific partioning was chosen to
ensure sufficient observations within each partion (the fewest
obserations are in the 0-5.0 partion and the greatest observa-
tions are in the 8.75-10.0 partion). The results are not
significantly altered using several alternative, and equally
arbitrary, part ionings .
6
The form of the variance report frequency by performance
report frequency interaction with the cause variable is similar
to that with the production game quarter variable. The pre-
cision of causal probability for each cause is closer to that
of a normative model when either 1) the variance report fre-
quency is biweekly and the performance report frequency is quar-
terly, or 2) the variance report frequency is weekly and the
performance report frequency is semiannually. The overall
interaction of variance report frequency by performance report
frequency has the same form.
7
Examining the subjects' absolute costs above standard con-
firmed the simulation results that these costs are significantly
greater ( F " 3 4 . 4 : 1,68 d . f . ; p < . ) when the variance report
frequency is biweekly ($12241.85) than when the frequency is
weekly $9235.73).
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE LABOR EFFICIENCY VARIANCE REPORT
J. DOE, TELEPHONE FINAL ASSEMBLY DEPARTMENT MANAGER
II: PLANT CONTROLLER
IBCT: LABOR EFFICIENCY VARIANCE REPORT FOR WEEK 1, YEAR 1
HOURS
aidard labor allowed for actual production 958.33
ial labor incurred 985.20
o>r efficiency variance Unfavorable -26.87
h>r efficiency variance as a percent of standard
b>r efficiency budget remaining after this variance
STANDARD
DOLLARS
$ 115 0.00
$ 11822.40
$ -322.40
2. 804%
$ 7577.60
fOU WANT THIS VARIANCE INVESTIGATED?
Press Y for YES or N for NO
CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT YOUR DECISION IS THE BEST?
Input a NUMBER between:
0(miniraum confidence) and 10 (maximum confidence)
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TABLE 1
INITIAL PARAMETERS OF A LABOR EFFICIENCY ENVIRONMENT
Underlying_Controlled_Process
In-Control Distribution
Mean labor hours per week 958.33
Variance of labor hours per week 1128.47
Prior probability for in-control 0.90
Ou t -of-Con t ro 1 Distribution
Meanlaborhoursperweek 1041.67
Variance of labor hours per week 2821.18
Prior probability for out-of-control 0.10
Control_and_Accounting_Information_SYstera
Frequency of Variance Report Weekly
Expected Costs Associated With:
Not investigating an in-control variance $ 0.00
Investigating an in-control variance $ 275.00
Investigating an out-of-control variance $ 4 5 0.00
Not investigating an out-of-control variance $1000.00
Cost Ratio 0.50
TABLE 2
RESULTS OF SIMULATION OVER THIRTY YEARS' PRODUCTION
In-Control Distribution
Mean labor hours per week
Variance of labor hours per week
Number of variances
Number of variances investigated
Out-of-Con t rol Distribution
Mean labor hours per week
Variance of labor hours per week
Number of variances
Number of variances investigated:
Within single period
After multiple periods
Average Annual Costs Above Standard
Cost Rat io
Optimal Critical Decision Value In
Labor Hours per Week
WEEKLY BI-WEEKLY
REPORTS REPORTS
958.02 958. 19
1108.94 490.89
1366 604
72 57
1051.44 1041.65
2382.81 2890. 19
194 176
158 15 8
36 18
$10081 .92 $14551. 88
0.50 0. 18
1010. 10 986.46
TABLE 3
PRECISION OF SUBJECTS' CAUSAL PROBABILITIES
SOURCE DF SS MS F*
Total 1727 241.849
Between Subjects 71 11.280
Variance Report Freq. (VR) 1 0.096 0.096
Perf. Report Freq. (PR) 1 0. 152 0. 152
VR x PR 1 1.202 1.202 8. 318
Subject 1 VR x PR 68 9.829 0. 145
Within Subjects 1656 230.569
Causes ( C
)
2 24.783 12.392 16.374
VR x C 2 3.803 1.901
PR x C 2 2.005 1.003
VR x PR x C 2 8.614 4.307 5.691
C x Subject : VR x PR 136 102.927 0.757
Production Game Quart er (Q) 7 1.240 0. 177 14.695
VR x Q 7 0.021 0.003
PR x Q 7 0. 149 0.021
VR x PR x Q 7 0.279 0. 040 3.30 9
Q x Subject : VR x PR 476 5.737 0.012
C x Q 14 13.688 0.978 14.486
VR x C x Q 14 0.606 0.043
PR x C x Q 14 1. 195 0.0 85
VR x PR x C x Q 14 1.270 0.091
C x Q x Subject ! VR x PR 952 64.252 0.067
*A11 F-ratios p< .01; Model R-Square = 0.244
PRODUCTION iSAME QUARTER
7
-.081Mean
1
-. 022
2
-.037
3
-.059
4
-.058
5
-.053
6
-.067
8
-. 1 17
Variance
. 142 .153 .157 .111 . 113 . 116 . 166 . 161
n 2 16 216 216 216 216 216 216 216
TABLE 4
SUBJECTS' OVER/UNDER CONFIDENCE OF INVESTIGATION DECISIONS
SOURCE DF 00 00 MS F*
Total 143 1
,
.855
Between Subjects 71 1..352
Variance Report Fre q. (VR) 1 0,.008 0.008
Perf . Report Fre q. (pr; 1 0.,006 0.006
VR x PR 1 0,.005 0.005
Subject 1 VR x PR 68 1,.333 0.020
Within Subjects 72 .503
Deci s ion ( D
)
1 0,.111 0.111 20.419
VR x D 1 .023 0.023 4.327
PR x D 1 .000 0. 000
VR x PR x D 1 .000 0.000
D x Subject 1 VR x PR 68 .369 0.005
*A11 F-ratios p< .01; Model R-Square = 0.083
Mean
Variance
n
lDYestigatj.on_
No Yes_
138 -.089
010 .015
72 72
Mean
Var i ance
n
No_Investigation
?iy§§hlY Weekly
-.1.44 -.133
.011 .009
36 36
Biw§e}<lY Weekly
-.063 -.103
.013 .016
36 36
TABLE 5
EFFICIENCY OF SUBJECTS' COSTS ABOVE STANDARD
SOURCE DF SS MS
Total 143 56
Between Subjects
Variance Report Freq. ( V R
)
Perf. Report Freq. (PR)
VR x PR
Subjects : VR x PR
Within Subjects
Production Game Year (Y)
VR x Y
PR x Y
VR x PR x Y
Y x Subject ! VR x PR
71 1.
,
111
1 0,.220 0.,220 16. 852*
1 0.,001 0.,001
1 0.,000 0,,000
68 0.,889 0,,013
72 1, . 145
1 0.,262 0.,262 21.621*
1 0,.061 0,.061 5.056**
1 0,,000 0.,000
1 0,.000 0,,000
68 0.,823 0.,012
*p< .01; **p< .025; Model R-Square = 0.242
Mean
Variance
n
Y§rA§Qce_Report_Frequency
_Weekly_ Bj.weekly
0.156 0.078
0.018 0.011
72 72
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Figure 1. Effects of variance report frequency by performance report
frequency by production game quarter interaction of the precision of
subjects' causal probabilities.
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Figure 2. Effects of cause by production game quarter interaction
on the precision of subjects' causal probabilities.
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Figure 3. Subjects' overall calibration curves for investigation
decision confidence.
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Figure 4. Subjects' calibration curves for investigation
decision confidence, by nature of decision.
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Figure 5. Effects of variance report frequency by production game year
interaction on the efficiency of subjects' costs above standard.


